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Abstract—For gambling on horses, a one-parameter family of
utility functions is proposed, which contains Kelly’s logarithmic
criterion and the expected-return criterion as special cases. The
strategies that maximize the utility function are derived, and the
connection to the Rényi divergence is shown. Optimal strategies
are also derived when the gambler has some side information;
this setting leads to a novel conditional Rényi divergence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a horse race with m ≥ 1 horses 1, . . . ,m, where
the i-th horse wins with probability pi > 0, and on which a
bookie offers odds oi > 0 for 1. A gambler spends all her
wealth γ0 > 0 to place bets on the horses. Let bi ≥ 0 denote
the fraction of γ0 that the gambler bets on the i-th horse. Let
the random variable X denote the winning horse, and define
the wealth relative S as
S , bX oX , (1)
so the gambler’s wealth after one race is γ1 = γ0S.
Kelly [1] observed that in the setting where the odds and
winning probabilities remain constant over many independent
races and the gambler keeps investing all her wealth with
the same relative allocation b1, . . . , bm, the exponential rate
of growth of the gambler’s wealth tends to E[logS] with
probability one, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
γn
γ0
= E[logS], (2)
where γn denotes the gambler’s wealth after n horse races,
and log(·) denotes the base-2 logarithm. The RHS of (2) is
known as the doubling rate [2, Section 6.1].
In this paper, we seek betting strategies that maximize
Uβ ,
1
β
log E[Sβ], (3)
where β ∈ R \ {0} is a parameter. This family of utility
functions generalizes several important cases:
a) In the limit as β tends to zero, Uβ tends to the doubling
rate E[logS], and we recover Kelly’s result: irrespective of
the odds, the optimal strategy is proportional betting, i.e.,
choosing bi = pi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}; see Proposition 2.
b) If β = 1, then maximizing Uβ is equivalent to maximizing
E[S], the expected return, and it is optimal to put all the
money on a horse that maximizes pioi; see Proposition 3.
c) In general, if β ≥ 1, then it is optimal to put all the money
on one horse; see Proposition 3. This is risky: if that horse
loses, the gambler will be broke.
d) In the limit as β tends to +∞, it is optimal to put all the
money on a horse that maximizes oi, ignoring the winning
probabilities. This strategy maximizes the best-case payoff;
see Proposition 4.
e) In the limit as β tends to −∞, it is optimal to choose
bi = c/oi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, where c is the normalizing
constant defined in (7) ahead. This strategy maximizes the
worst-case payoff and is completely risk-free: irrespective
of which horse wins, S = c; see Proposition 5.
Our utility function has the following underlying structure:
it is the logarithm of a (weighted) power mean [3], [4]:
Uβ = log
[
m∑
i=1
pi (bioi)
β
] 1
β
. (4)
For β ∈ {−∞, 0, 1,∞}, the power mean is equal to the
minimum, the geometric mean, the arithmetic mean, and the
maximum of the set {bioi}
m
i=1, respectively. Campbell [5], [6]
used a cost function with a structure similar to (4) to provide
an operational meaning to the Rényi entropy in source coding.
Other information-theoretic examples of exponential moments
were studied in [7]. The utility function Uβ can be motivated
by risk aversion models in finance theory [8, (8)].
Our main result is Theorem 1, which shows that for β < 1,
Uβ can be written as the sum of three terms; the central role
is played by the Rényi divergence. After dealing with the
other values of β, we treat in Theorem 6 the situation where
the gambler, prior to placing her bets, observes some side
information. This analysis features a novel conditional Rényi
divergence, whose properties are studied in Propositions 7
and 8. In Proposition 9 and Theorem 10, we study the situation
where the gambler invests only part of her money.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section II,
we recall the Rényi divergence and define a conditional Rényi
divergence, and in Section III, we present our results; all proofs
are deferred to Section IV.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The following definitions are for probability mass functions
(PMFs); the definitions for probability vectors are analogous.
When clear from the context, we often omit sets and sub-
scripts: for example, we write
∑
x for
∑
x∈X and p(x) for
pX(x). The Rényi divergence of order α between two PMFs
pX and qX [9] is defined for positive α other than one as
Dα(pX‖qX) ,
1
α− 1
log
∑
x
p(x)α q(x)1−α. (5)
Its properties are studied in [10].
Let pY be a PMF, and let pX|Y and qX|Y be conditional
PMFs. We define the conditional Rényi divergence of order α
for positive α other than one as
Dα(pX|Y ‖qX|Y |pY )
,
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
p(y)
[∑
x
p(x|y)α q(x|y)1−α
] 1
α
. (6)
This definition differs from other definitions of the conditional
Rényi divergence [11, (6) and (8)]. Some of its properties are
presented in Propositions 7 and 8 ahead.
III. RESULTS
We first analyze the situation where the gambler invests all
her money, i.e., where b , (b1, . . . , bm) is a probability vector.
(A probability vector is a vector with nonnegative components
that add up to one.) As in [12, Section 10.3], define
c ,
[
m∑
i=1
1
oi
]−1
, (7)
the probability vector p , (p1, . . . , pm), and the probability
vector r , (r1, . . . , rm), where for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
ri ,
c
oi
. (8)
Theorem 1. Let β ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), and let b be a
probability vector. Then,
1
β
log E[Sβ] = log c+D 1
1−β
(p‖r)−D1−β(g‖b), (9)
where for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
gi ,
p
1
1−β
i o
β
1−β
i∑m
j=1 p
1
1−β
j o
β
1−β
j
. (10)
Thus, the choice b = g uniquely maximizes 1β log E[S
β] among
all probability vectors b.
We see from Theorem 1 that if β ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), then
our utility function can be written as the sum of three terms:
1) The first term, log c, depends only on the odds and is
related to the fairness of the odds. The odds are called
subfair if c < 1, fair if c = 1, and superfair if c > 1.
2) The second term, D 1
1−β
(p‖r), is related to the bookie’s
estimate of the winning probabilities. It is zero if and
only if the odds are inversely proportional to the winning
probabilities.
3) The third term, −D1−β(g‖b), is related to the gambler’s
estimate of the winning probabilities. It is zero if and
only if b is equal to g.
Proposition 2. Let b be a probability vector. Then,
lim
β→0
1
β
log E[Sβ] = E[logS] (11)
= log c+D(p‖r)−D(p‖b). (12)
We see from Proposition 2 that in the limit as β tends to
zero, the doubling rate E[logS] is recovered from our utility
function. Here, the analog of (9) is (12); note that (12) implies
that E[logS] is maximized if and only if b is equal to p.
Proposition 3. Let β ≥ 1, and let b be a probability vector.
Then,
1
β
log E[Sβ] ≤ log max
i∈{1,...,m}
(
p
1/β
i oi
)
. (13)
Equality in (13) can be achieved by choosing
bi =
{
1 if i = i∗,
0 otherwise,
(14)
where i∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is such that
p
1/β
i∗ oi∗ = max
i∈{1,...,m}
(
p
1/β
i oi
)
. (15)
We see from Proposition 3 that if β ≥ 1, then it is optimal
to bet on a single horse. Unless m = 1, this is not the case
when β < 1: When β < 1, an optimal betting strategy requires
placing a bet on every horse. This follows from Theorem 1
and our assumption that pi and oi are all positive.
Proposition 4. Let b be a probability vector. Then,
lim
β→+∞
1
β
log E[Sβ] = log max
i∈{1,...,m}
bioi (16)
≤ log max
i∈{1,...,m}
oi. (17)
Equality in (17) can be achieved by choosing
bi =
{
1 if i = i∗,
0 otherwise,
(18)
where i∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is such that oi∗ = maxi∈{1,...,m} oi.
Proposition 5. Let b be a probability vector. Then,
lim
β→−∞
1
β
log E[Sβ] = log min
i∈{1,...,m}
bioi (19)
≤ log c. (20)
Equality in (20) is achieved if and only if bi = c/oi for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Our next result concerns the situation where the gambler
observes some side information Y before placing her bets. To
that end, we adapt our notation as follows: Let pXY be the
joint PMF of X and Y . (Recall that X denotes the winning
horse.) Denote the range ofX and Y by X and Y , respectively.
We assume that p(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y . (Here, we do not
assume that the winning probabilities p(x) are positive.) We
view the odds as a function o : X → R>0. Define
c ,
[∑
x
1
o(x)
]−1
, (21)
and the PMF rX for x ∈ X as
rX(x) ,
c
o(x)
. (22)
(These definitions are equivalent to (7) and (8), respectively.)
We continue to assume that the gambler invests all her wealth,
so a betting strategy is now a conditional PMF bX|Y . The
wealth relative S˜ is defined as
S˜ , bX|Y (X |Y )o(X). (23)
The following theorem parallels Theorem 1:
Theorem 6. Let β ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1). Then,
1
β
log E[S˜β] = log c+D 1
1−β
(pX|Y ‖rX |pY )
−D1−β(gX|Y gY ‖bX|Y gY ), (24)
where for x ∈ X and y ∈ Y ,
g(x|y) ,
p(x|y)
1
1−β o(x)
β
1−β∑
x′ p(x
′|y)
1
1−β o(x′)
β
1−β
, (25)
g(y) ,
p(y)
[∑
x′ p(x
′|y)
1
1−β o(x′)
β
1−β
]1−β
∑
y′ p(y
′)
[∑
x′ p(x
′|y′)
1
1−β o(x′)
β
1−β
]1−β . (26)
Thus, choosing bX|Y = gX|Y uniquely maximizes
1
β log E[S˜
β]
among all conditional PMFs bX|Y .
The conditional Rényi divergence Dα(·‖·|·) appearing in
Theorem 6 was defined in Section II and seems to be novel. It
is easy to see that Dα(pX‖qX |pY ) = Dα(pX‖qX) if pX , qX ,
and pY are PMFs. We now present some more properties:
Proposition 7. Let α ∈ (0, 1)∪ (1,∞), let pY be a PMF, and
let pX|Y and qX|Y be conditional PMFs. Then,
0 ≤ Dα(pX|Y ‖qX|Y |pY ) (27)
≤ Dα(pX|Y pY ‖qX|Y pY ). (28)
Because everything that can be achieved without side infor-
mation can also be achieved with side information, comparing
Theorem 1 and Theorem 6 suggests that Dα(pX‖rX) ≤
Dα(pX|Y ‖rX |pY ), which is indeed the case:
Proposition 8. Let α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞), let pXY be a joint
PMF, and let rX be a PMF. Then,
Dα(pX‖rX) ≤ Dα(pX|Y ‖rX |pY ). (29)
Our last results treat the possibility that the gambler does
not invest all her wealth. (We only treat the setting without side
information.) Denote by b0 the fraction of her wealth that the
gambler does not use for betting. Then, b , (b0, b1, . . . , bm)
is a probability vector, and the wealth relative S0 is given by
S0 , b0 + bX oX . (30)
If c ≥ 1, then it is optimal to invest all the money:
Proposition 9. Assume c ≥ 1, let β ∈ R \ {0}, and let b be a
probability vector with wealth relative S0. Then, there exists a
probability vector b′ with wealth relative S′0 satisfying b
′
0 = 0
and
1
β
log E[S′β0 ] ≥
1
β
log E[Sβ0 ]. (31)
On the other hand, if the odds are subfair, i.e., if c < 1,
then investing all the money is not optimal in the case β < 1,
as Claim 3 of the following theorem shows:
Theorem 10. Assume c < 1, let β ∈ (−∞, 0)∪ (0, 1), and let
b∗ be a probability vector that maximizes 1β log E[S
β
0 ] among
all probability vectors b. Define
J , {i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : b∗i > 0}, (32)
Γ ,
1−
∑
i∈J pi
1−
∑
i∈J
1
oi
, (33)
and for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
γi , max
{
0, Γ
1
β−1 p
1
1−β
i o
β
1−β
i −
1
oi
}
. (34)
Then, the following claims hold:
1) The quantity Γ is well-defined and satisfies Γ > 0.
2) For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
b∗i = γi b
∗
0. (35)
3) The quantity b∗0 satisfies
b∗0 =
1
1 +
∑m
i=1 γi
. (36)
In particular, b∗0 > 0.
Claim 2 implies that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, b∗i > 0 if and
only if pioi > Γ. Assuming without loss of generality that
p1o1 ≥ p2o2 ≥ . . . ≥ pmom, the set J thus has a special
structure: it is either empty or equal to {1, 2, . . . , k} for some
integer k. To maximize 1β log E[S
β
0 ], the following procedure
can be used: for every J with the above structure, compute
the corresponding b according to (33)–(36); and from these
b’s, take one that maximizes 1β log E[S
β
0 ]. This procedure leads
to an optimal solution: an optimal solution b∗ exists because
we are optimizing a continuous function over a compact set,
and b∗ corresponds to a set J that will be considered by the
procedure.
IV. PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 1. We first show the maximization claim.
The only term on the RHS of (9) that depends on b is
−D1−β(g‖b). Because 1 − β > 0, this term is maximized
if and only if b = g [10, Theorem 8].
We now show (9). By the definition of S,
1
β
log E[Sβ ] =
1
β
log
m∑
i=1
pio
β
i b
β
i . (37)
For every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
pio
β
i b
β
i =
[
p
1
1−β
i o
β
1−β
i
]1−β
· bβi (38)
=

 m∑
j=1
p
1
1−β
j o
β
1−β
j


1−β
· g1−βi b
β
i , (39)
where (39) follows from (10). From (37) and (39) we obtain
1
β
log E[Sβ]
=
1− β
β
log
m∑
j=1
p
1
1−β
j o
β
1−β
j +
1
β
log
m∑
i=1
g1−βi b
β
i (40)
=
1− β
β
log
m∑
j=1
p
1
1−β
j o
β
1−β
j −D1−β(g‖b) (41)
= log c+
1− β
β
log
m∑
j=1
p
1
1−β
j r
−β
1−β
j −D1−β(g‖b) (42)
= log c+D 1
1−β
(p‖r)−D1−β(g‖b), (43)
where (41) follows from identifying the Rényi divergence (g
and b are probability vectors); (42) follows from (7) and (8);
and (43) follows from identifying the Rényi divergence (p and
r are probability vectors). This proves (9). 
Proof of Proposition 2. Equation (11) holds because
lim
β→0
1
β
log E[Sβ] = lim
β→0
log
[
m∑
i=1
pi (oi bi)
β
] 1
β
(44)
= log
m∏
i=1
(oi bi)
pi (45)
=
m∑
i=1
pi log(oi bi) (46)
= E[logS], (47)
where (44) follows from the definition of S, and (45) holds
because in the limit as β tends to zero, the power mean tends
to the geometric mean since p is a probability vector [3, Prob-
lem 8.1]. Equation (12) is proved in [12, Section 10.3]. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Inequality (13) holds because
1
β
log E[Sβ] =
1
β
log
m∑
i=1
pio
β
i b
β
i (48)
≤
1
β
log
m∑
i=1
pio
β
i bi (49)
≤
1
β
log
m∑
i=1
bi · max
j∈{1,...,m}
(
pj o
β
j
)
(50)
=
1
β
log max
j∈{1,...,m}
(
pj o
β
j
)
(51)
= log max
j∈{1,...,m}
(
p
1/β
j oj
)
, (52)
where (48) follows from the definition of S; (49) holds because
bi ∈ [0, 1] and β ≥ 1; and (51) holds because b is a probability
vector. It is easy to see that (13) holds with equality if b is
chosen according to (14). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Equation (16) holds because
lim
β→+∞
1
β
log E[Sβ] = lim
β→+∞
log
[
m∑
i=1
pi (bioi)
β
] 1
β
(53)
= log max
i∈{1,...,m}
bioi, (54)
where (53) follows from the definition of S, and (54) holds
because in the limit as β tends to +∞, the power mean tends
to the maximum since p is a probability vector [3, Chapter 8].
Inequality (17) holds because bi ≤ 1 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
It is easy to see that (17) holds with equality if b is chosen
according to (18). 
Proof of Proposition 5. Equation (19) holds because
lim
β→−∞
1
β
log E[Sβ] = lim
β→−∞
log
[
m∑
i=1
pi (bioi)
β
] 1
β
(55)
= log min
i∈{1,...,m}
bioi, (56)
where (55) follows from the definition of S, and (56) holds
because in the limit as β tends to −∞, the power mean tends
to the minimum since p is a probability vector [3, Chapter 8].
We show (20) by contradiction. Assume that there exists a
probability vector b such that mini∈{1,...,m} bioi > c, i.e.,
bioi > c (57)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Then,
1 =
m∑
i=1
bi (58)
>
m∑
i=1
c
oi
(59)
= 1, (60)
where (58) holds because b is a probability vector; (59) follows
from (57); and (60) follows from the definition of c. Because
1 > 1 is impossible, such a b cannot exist, which proves (20).
It is easy to see that (20) holds with equality if bi = c/oi
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Conversely, if (20) holds with equality,
then for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
bioi ≥ c. (61)
We claim that (61) holds with equality for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Indeed, if this were not the case, then there would exist a
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} for which bj oj > c, so (58)–(60) would hold,
which would lead to a contradiction. Hence, if (20) holds with
equality, then bi = c/oi for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. 
Proof of Theorem 6. We first show the maximization claim.
The only term on the RHS of (24) that depends on bX|Y is
−D1−β(gX|Y gY ‖bX|Y gY ). Because 1 − β > 0, this term is
maximized if and only if bX|Y gY = gX|Y gY [10, Theorem 8].
By our assumptions that p(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y and o(x) > 0
for all x ∈ X , we have g(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y . Consequently,
bX|Y gY = gX|Y gY if and only if bX|Y = gX|Y .
We now show (24). By the definition of S˜,
1
β
log E[S˜β] =
1
β
log
∑
x,y
p(x, y)o(x)β b(x|y)β . (62)
From (25) and (26) we obtain that for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y ,
p(x, y)o(x)β b(x|y)β
=
∑
y′
p(y′)
[∑
x′
p(x′|y′)
1
1−β o(x′)
β
1−β
]1−β
· g(y)g(x|y)1−β b(x|y)β . (63)
Now, (24) holds because
1
β
log E[S˜β]
=
1
β
log
∑
y′
p(y′)
[∑
x′
p(x′|y′)
1
1−β o(x′)
β
1−β
]1−β
+
1
β
log
∑
x,y
[
g(x|y)g(y)
]1−β[
b(x|y)g(y)
]β
(64)
= log c+
1
β
log
∑
y′
p(y′)
[∑
x′
p(x′|y′)
1
1−β r(x′)
−β
1−β
]1−β
+
1
β
log
∑
x,y
[
g(x|y)g(y)
]1−β[
b(x|y)g(y)
]β
(65)
= log c+D 1
1−β
(pX|Y ‖rX |pY )
−D1−β(gX|Y gY ‖bX|Y gY ), (66)
where (64) follows from plugging (63) into (62) and using the
fact that g(y) = g(y)1−β g(y)β ; (65) follows from (22); and
(66) follows from identifying the conditional Rényi divergence
and the (unconditional) Rényi divergence. 
Proof of Proposition 7. We first show (27). If α ∈ (0, 1), then
Hölder’s inequality implies that for all y ∈ Y ,
∑
x
p(x|y)α q(x|y)1−α ≤
[∑
x
p(x|y)
]α[∑
x
q(x|y)
]1−α
. (67)
The RHS of (67) equals one, so
log
∑
y
p(y)
[∑
x
p(x|y)α q(x|y)1−α
] 1
α
≤ 0, (68)
which implies (27) because αα−1 < 0. If α > 1, then the
inequalities in (67) and (68) are reversed; since now αα−1 > 0,
(27) holds also in this case.
We now show (28). If α > 1, then (28) holds because
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
p(y)
[∑
x
p(x|y)α q(x|y)1−α
] 1
α
≤
α
α− 1
log
[∑
y
p(y)
∑
x
p(x|y)αq(x|y)1−α
] 1
α
(69)
=
1
α− 1
log
∑
x,y
[p(x|y)p(y)]α[q(x|y)p(y)]1−α, (70)
where (69) follows from Jensen’s inequality because z 7→ z
1
α
is a concave function on R≥0, and (70) holds because p(y) =
p(y)αp(y)1−α. If α ∈ (0, 1), then z 7→ z
1
α is convex, so
Jensen’s inequality is reversed; because αα−1 < 0, (69) and
thus (28) hold also in this case. 
Proof of Proposition 8. If α > 1, then (29) holds because
Dα(pX‖rX)
=
α
α− 1
log
{∑
x
[
p(x)r(x)
1−α
α
]α} 1α
(71)
=
α
α− 1
log
{∑
x
[∑
y
p(y)p(x|y)r(x)
1−α
α
]α} 1α
(72)
≤
α
α− 1
log
∑
y
p(y)
{∑
x
[
p(x|y)r(x)
1−α
α
]α} 1α
(73)
= Dα(pX|Y ‖rX |pY ), (74)
where (73) follows from the Minkowski inequality [4, III 2.4
Theorem 9]. If α ∈ (0, 1), then the Minkowski inequality is
reversed; since now αα−1 < 0, (73) and thus (29) hold also in
this case. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Set b′0 = 0 and b
′
i = ri b0 + bi for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Then,
∑m
i=0 b
′
i = 1, and for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
oi b
′
i = cb0 + oi bi (75)
≥ b0 + oi bi, (76)
where (76) holds because c ≥ 1. It is not difficult to see that
(76) implies (31). 
Proof of Theorem 10. In the Appendix. 
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 10. The proof is based on the Karush–
Kuhn–Tucker conditions.
Assume first that β ∈ (0, 1), and define the function τ from
the set of probability vectors to the set of real numbers as
τ(b) ,
m∑
i=1
pi (b0 + bioi)
β . (77)
Since 1β > 0 and since the logarithm is an increasing function,
maximizing 1β log E[S
β
0 ] is equivalent to maximizing τ .
Observe that τ is concave, so by the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker
conditions [13, Theorem 4.4.1], it is maximized by a proba-
bility vector b if and only if there exists a λ ∈ R such that (i)
for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,m} with bi > 0,
∂τ
∂bi
(b) = λ, (78)
and (ii) for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,m} with bi = 0,
∂τ
∂bi
(b) ≤ λ. (79)
From now on, we use the following notation: (i) and (ii) hold
simultaneously if and only if for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,m},
∂τ
∂bi
(b)
{
= λ if bi > 0,
≤ λ if bi = 0.
(80)
Dividing both sides of (80) by β > 0 and defining µ , λβ , we
obtain
1
β
·
∂τ
∂bi
(b)
{
= µ if bi > 0,
≤ µ if bi = 0.
(81)
Evaluating (81) leads to
m∑
i=1
pi (b0 + bioi)
β−1
{
= µ if b0 > 0,
≤ µ if b0 = 0,
(82)
and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
pioi (b0 + bioi)
β−1
{
= µ if bi > 0,
≤ µ if bi = 0.
(83)
Assume now that β < 0, and define τ as in (77). Then,
maximizing 1β log E[S
β
0 ] is equivalent to minimizing τ because
now 1β < 0. The function τ is convex, so the inequality in (79)
is reversed. Dividing by β < 0 again reverses the inequalities,
so (81)–(83) hold also if β < 0.
Let β ∈ (−∞, 0)∪ (0, 1), and let b∗ be a probability vector
that maximizes 1β log E[S
β
0
]. By the above discussion, (82) and
(83) are satisfied by b∗ for some µ ∈ R. The LHS of (82) is
positive, so µ > 0. We now show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
b∗i = max
{
0,
[
pio
β
i
µ
] 1
1−β
−
b∗0
oi
}
. (84)
Fix i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. If b∗i > 0, then (83) implies
b∗i =
[
pio
β
i
µ
] 1
1−β
−
b∗0
oi
. (85)
Because b∗i > 0, the RHS of (85) is positive, which proves
(84) in the case b∗i > 0. If b
∗
i = 0, then (83) implies[
pio
β
i
µ
] 1
1−β
−
b∗0
oi
≤ 0. (86)
The LHS of (86) is nonpositive, so (84) holds also if b∗i = 0.
We show next that b∗j = 0 for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. For
a contradiction, assume that b∗i > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Then,
m∑
i=1
pi (b
∗
0 + b
∗
i oi)
β−1 = µ ·
m∑
i=1
1
oi
(87)
> µ, (88)
where (87) follows from (83), and (88) holds because c < 1
by assumption. But this is impossible: (88) contradicts (82).
Now, let j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be such that b∗j = 0. Because pj
and oj are positive, this implies b
∗
0 > 0 by (84). Thus, (82)
implies
m∑
i=1
pi (b
∗
0 + b
∗
i oi)
β−1 = µ. (89)
Splitting the sum on the LHS of (89) depending on whether
b∗i = 0 or b
∗
i > 0, we obtain
µ =
∑
i∈J
pi
{
oi ·
[
pio
β
i
µ
] 1
1−β
}β−1
+
∑
i/∈J
pi (b
∗
0)
β−1 (90)
= µ
∑
i∈J
1
oi
+ (b∗0)
β−1
[
1−
∑
i∈J
pi
]
, (91)
where (90) follows from (84). Rearranging (91), we obtain
µ
[
1−
∑
i∈J
1
oi
]
= (b∗0)
β−1
[
1−
∑
i∈J
pi
]
. (92)
Because b∗j = 0, j /∈ J , so 1 −
∑
i∈J pi > 0. Additionally,
µ > 0 and b∗0 > 0, so 1−
∑
i∈J
1
oi
> 0. This proves Claim 1,
because it implies that Γ is well-defined and positive.
By the definition of Γ, (92) implies
µ = Γ(b∗0)
β−1. (93)
Plugging (93) into (84) establishes Claim 2, i.e., that for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
b∗i = γi b
∗
0. (94)
We move on to Claim 3. Because b∗ is a probability vector,
1 = b∗0 +
m∑
i=1
b∗i (95)
= b∗0
[
1 +
m∑
i=1
γi
]
, (96)
where (96) follows from (94). Now, (96) implies Claim 3. 
